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SUPER HIGHWAY ROBBERY: THE SEC AND THE EVOLUTION
OF ONLINE SECURITIES FRAUD
Sean A. Kennedy1

I.

INTRODUCTION:

The Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was formally created and
empowered through Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “’34 Act”)2 as
well as the 1933 Securities Act (the “’33 Act.”)3 One of the main purposes of the SEC is
to regulate the registration and sale of securities in the primary and secondary markets.4
The SEC was created as a response from the government to the Great Depression of
1929.5 Thus, it is unsurprising that the legislators who passed these Acts did not foresee
the radical changes that the creation of the internet and onset of the digital age would
bring to the securities market.
In 2011, over 2.4 billion people across the world accessed the Internet.6
Moreover, it is estimated that “users access about 100 billion web pages every day.”7
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This increase in Internet usage has facilitated the ability to commit securities fraud. To
illustrate, as of 2001 the SEC had brought a total of 209 internet related enforcement
actions for fraud.8 Last year alone, the SEC brought 735 enforcement actions against
corporations and individuals.9 It is estimated that over two-thirds of all the current cases
brought by the SEC are related to some type of internet-based fraud.10
Initially, SEC regulators had split opinions regarding the impact the Internet
would have in the future of securities fraud enforcement. Some at the SEC believed that
the current system of enforcement laws would be sufficient safeguards to handle the
expansion of internet fraud, while others perceived this expansion as a threat to consumer
safety.11 In 1997, John Stark, the Chief of the SEC’s Office of Internet Enforcement
(“OIE,”) expressed his belief that the SEC did not need to promulgate any new laws in
order to combat internet fraud.12 Specifically, he stated
Most of the SEC's rules and regulations apply equally over the Internet as
they would to any new medium. There is at present no desire on the behalf
of the Division of Enforcement, or really as the SEC as a whole, for any
new broad or overreaching types of regulations but from the enforcement
side, the current antifraud provisions will do just fine.13

http://www.icann.org/en/presentations/beckstrom-speech-izmir- turkey-17may11-en.pdf))
(emphasis added).
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Conversely, in 1999 the Director of the SEC’s Office of Enforcement, Richard Walker,
noted “policing the Internet is unquestionably our greatest enforcement challenge
today.”14
This paper will take an in-depth look at the increase of securities fraud perpetrated
over the Internet and the SEC’s response to these newfound threats in an effort to
determine which of the divergent views expressed by the respective Directors was more
accurate. Part II of this paper will provide a background of the SEC’s enforcement
ability framework that is used to bring actions against individuals that commit securities
fraud. Part III of this paper will look at the former and current trends in online securities
fraud transactions. Finally, Part IV of this paper will conclude by evaluating the internal
effectiveness of the SEC as well as look at a privately funded program that can be used to
identify and report online securities fraud schemes.

II.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT ABILITY:

In order to fully understand the impact the evolution of the Internet has had upon
the SEC, it is necessary to first look at the current legal framework that is used to bring
enforcement actions against perpetrators of securities fraud. The SEC has the ability to
bring enforcement actions against individuals or companies that violate various portions
of the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, which relate to issuances and misrepresentations concerning
securities.15 Collectively, these Acts protect both the initial issuance of securities when

14

Byron D. Hittle, An Uphill Battle: The Difficulty of Deterring and Detecting
Perpetrators of Internet Stock Fraud, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 165, 167 (2001) (quoting,
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companies first attempt to register and sell them in the market, as well as the subsequent
resale of these securities on the secondary market by traders and investors.16
A threshold issue that courts consider during this process is determining what
exactly constitutes a security. The term “security” is defined broadly in both the ’33 and
the ’34 Acts.17

Further, in SEC v. W.J. Howey, the Supreme Court stated that an

investment contract, or, security, under the ’33 Acts is “a contract, transaction, or
scheme, whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party.”18 Courts have relaxed the
“solely” requirement of the Howey test and consider stocks to fall under the both the ’33
and ’34 Acts definition of a security when they have “(i) the right to receive dividends
contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be
pledged or hypothe-cated [sic]; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the
number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.”19

16

Id.
Both Acts define a security as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, securitybased swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
[sic] certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c.
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Again, the SEC generally brings enforcement actions for violations involving
these securities under both the ’33 and ’34 Acts.20 Specifically, the ’33 Act is used to
regulate conduct in the primary market wherein the impetus of the violation is the initial
issuance of a security.21 Under Section 11 of the ’33 Act, the SEC may bring an action
against any signee of a registration statement who makes a material misrepresentation or
omission relating to the issuance of a security.22

Misrepresentations and omissions

relating to the resale of securities on the secondary market are regulated by the ’34 Act.23
The main antifraud provision used by the SEC to pursue violations under the ’34 Act is
the 10(b)-5 provision.24 This provision states that
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.25
Courts have determined that the requisite elements to bring a 10(b)-5 claim
include: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6)

20

See, supra note 2.
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24
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loss causation.26 However, courts have recently placed the greatest emphasis on proving
the element of materiality.27
The Tenth Circuit weighed in on the determination of the materiality requirement
under 10(b)-5 in cases involving online fraud. In S.E.C. v. Curshen, an investor omitted
the fact the he was being paid to promote a stock for a company.28 Further, the investor
was making anonymous postings online with the intention of getting unsuspecting people
to purchase the company’s stock he was being paid to tout.29 The court stated
[t]hus, a voluntary statement invokes a duty to disclose only if it is
material. A statement or omission is only material if a reasonable investor
would consider it important in determining whether to buy or sell stock”
and if it would have significantly altered the total mix of information
available to current and potential investors.30
The court determined that a reasonable investor would consider the motivation of the
individual posting the information online as a “significant factor” in making a decision to
invest and found the Defendant’s actions sufficient to rise to the level of material.31
Once the SEC believes that it has enough facts to satisfy the materiality
requirement it will proceed to bring a suit against alleged fraudsters. However, the SEC
only has the authority to bring civil suits against perpetrators of securities fraud.32 In
order to bring criminal actions the SEC must cooperate with agencies such as the U.S
26

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184, (2011).
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246, (1988) (finding ‘Fraud on the Market’
acceptable to prove reliance on a material misrepresentations); see also Elieen Smith
Ewing, Fraud on the Cybermarket: Liability for Hyperlinked Misinformation Under Rule
10b-5, 56 Bus. Law. 375, 383 (2000) (“More recent decisions, however, have witnessed a
certain telescoping of the necessary elements—only materiality appears to remain a
requirement.”)
28
S.E.C. v. Curshen, 372 F. App'x 872, 874 (10th Cir. 2010).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 880 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
31
Id. at 881.
32
Hittle, supra note 14, at 187.
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Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigations or state enforcement agencies and
convince those agencies to bring criminal charges.33 However, a criminal violation under
10(b)-5 requires a higher degree of culpability than a civil infraction.34 In order to
establish a criminal violation, “the Government must prove that a person willfully
violated the provision,” whereas a civil action only requires the Government to prove
mere recklessness.35 This is the established framework used by the SEC when it brings
charges against individuals. The following section will analyze cases brought by the SEC
in order to determine if this current framework is adequate to protect investors from fraud
in the modern internet age.

III.

TWO MAIN CATEGORIES OF INTERNET BASED SECURITIES FRAUD:

The two main categories of internet based securities fraud are (1) market
manipulation and (2) offering frauds.36 This section will explain in detail how these
schemes operate as well as the devastating monetary effects they have on unsuspecting
victims. In addition, cases will be used to illustrate how the SEC initially responded to
these violations during the beginning of the internet era and will be followed by cases

examining how it currently responds to the modern versions of these schemes.
Importantly, all of the actions by the SEC discussed in this Section are based upon the
enforcement framework outlined in Section II.

33
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A.

Market Manipulation:
Market manipulation is generally defined as “the illegal practice of raising or

lowering a security's price by creating the appearance of active trading.”37 The Supreme
Court elaborated stating
[Market manipulation] is and was virtually a term of art when used in
connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the price of securities.38
Online market manipulation falls into two general categories: (1) the “Pump and Dump”
and (2) the “Cyber-smear.”39 Both categories focus on the manipulation of already issued
stock on the secondary market and the SEC generally prosecutes those who perpetrate
these frauds for 10(b)-5 violations in connection with their participation in these
schemes.40
1.

Pump and Dump Schemes

First, in a “pump and dump” scheme, the fraudster will purchase so-called “penny
stocks”41 and begin to circulate false and misleading information across the Internet in
order to drive up the price of the security.42

Fraudsters will make use of various

pseudonyms and anonymous postings in order to create “buzz” for these otherwise
worthless stocks.43 Once the price of the stock increases, the fraudster will sell his

37

Manipulation, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
39
Walker, Levine, supra note 8 at 411.
40
Id.
41
A penny stock as “an equity security that is not traded in established markets,
represents no tangible assets, or has average revenues less than required for trading on an
exchange. Typically, a penny stock is highly speculative and can be purchased for less
than $5 a share.” Stock, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
42
Hittle, supra note 14, at 169.
43
Id.
38
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interest in the stock, after it rises to a high point in order to turn a profit.44 Generally,
after the fraudster sells his interest the stock, the price of the stock crashes and innocent
investors suffer significant losses due to the rapid decline of the stock price.45
Enforcement actions brought by the SEC generally are contingent upon the type of
misrepresentations made by the fraudsters and the severity of the damage caused.46
In 1999, Jonathan Lebed committed one of the first newsworthy online “pump
and dump” schemes when he was only fifteen years old.47 Lebed purchased various
penny stocks and immediately begin spamming message boards on both Yahoo! Finance
and Silicon Investor in order to manufacture demand for the stocks.48 In one instance,
Lebed purchased 18,000 shares of a stock called MSHI for roughly $1.30 per share and
immediately began to spam various message boards claiming it was “the most
undervalued stock in history.”49 Shortly after, the stock price rose to roughly $4 per
share and Lebed made nearly $34,000 in profits.50
The SEC brought a 10(b)-5 action against Lebed and relied upon various actions
taken by Lebed in order to bolster its position in establishing the materiality
requirement.51

Specifically, the SEC focused on Lebed’s postings under various

anonymous names and pseudonyms that were used to create the illusion that many

44

Id.
Id.
46
Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412.
47
In re Jonathan G. Lebed, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43307, 2000 WL 1353040, 1
(Sept. 20, 2000).
48
Id. at 2.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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people, instead of just Lebed, were promoting the stock.52 Lebed insisted that his claims
were innocuous and on par with what investors do everyday, but the Commission decided
enough evidence existed to pursue a violation under the ’34 Act.53 This is important
because it is indicative of what actions taken by fraudsters may rise to the level of
materiality under 10(b)-5, instead of mere puffery, which is non actionable by the SEC.54
Ultimately, Lebed settled out of court with SEC, admitted no fault, and forfeited
$272,826 of profit.55 However, the SEC settlement only pertained to 11 out of 26 trades
made by Lebed and it is believed that after litigation he earned over $500,000 in profit
from these schemes.56 The Lebed case highlighted numerous problems the SEC initially
faced with the rampant expansion of online securities fraud.

While the SEC was

successful in pursuing litigation and ultimately reached a settlement with Lebed, the
fraudster ended up retaining 65% of the earnings he procured through an illegal “pump
and dump” scheme.57
The use of websites is another popular way to perpetrate “pump and dump”
schemes.58 These websites are sometimes referred to as “momentum trading” websites.59
These website generally have misleading statements regarding a track record of stock
predictions and will generate baseless claims regarding penny stocks the fraudsters are

52

Id.
Id.
54
Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that puffery “lacks the
materiality essential to a securities fraud allegation.”)
55
Hittle, supra note 14, at 187.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 425.
59
Id.
53
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trying to inflate.60 One example of this specific type of a “pump and dump” scheme
involved law students creating a fraudulent website called, “Fast-Trade.com.”61 In the
Fast-Trade.com case, the students used the website to manipulate the price of penny
stocks leading some stocks to have upwards of a 700% increase in value.62 When the
SEC discovered the fraud the students had already earned $345,000 in profit.63 The SEC
brought charges against the students under section 10(b)-5 of the ’34 Act.64 Similar to
the Lebed Case, the SEC focused on the specific actions of the student in creating the
website to establish the 10(b)-5 materiality element.65 However, the SEC was not able to
prove a high enough degree of intent to garner support for any criminal prosecution of the
students.66
Currently, “pump and dump” schemes are still widely utilized by fraudsters who
commit securities fraud using the Internet. One of the most popular ways to engage in
“pump and dump” schemes is through targeting email spamming.67 A study conducted in
order to determine the effectiveness of spam accounts found that “unsolicited e-mail
accounts for over 80 percent of all Internet e-mail traffic, which amounts to over 1.6
billion messages per week.”68 It is estimated that 15% of all current spam mail is related

60

Id.
In The Matter Of Kenneth Terrell, Jason Wyckoff, Adam Altman And Joanne Colt,
Exchange Act Release, No. 34-42483, 2000 WL 248549, 1 (March, 2, 200).
62
Id. at 2.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 9.
65
Id.
66
See generally, id.
67
Laura Frieder, Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and
Corresponding Market Activity, 30 Hastings Comm. & Ent L.J. 479, 480 (2008).
68
Id.
61
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to “pump and dump” stock schemes.69 In other words, nearly 240 million spam messages
per week are sent out attempting to defraud legitimate investors.
In a recent “pump and dump” case, two brother created a website called
doublestocks.com to advertise a newsletter containing stock picks made by a “stock
picking robot.”70 In reality, there was no “stock-picking robot” and the stocks listed in
the newsletter consisted of penny stocks that were hand picked by the brothers.71 In
addition, the brothers were paid by stock promoters to increase the value of various
penny stocks.72 In total the brothers were paid over $1.8 million by various stock
promoters for this service.73 The SEC brought a 10(b)-5 claim against the brothers and
ordered them to disgorge all of their profits from the scheme.74
The importance of this recent case is that it highlights how the SEC has not
changed its course in pursing internet fraudsters. The allegations and enforcement action
brought against the brothers in the “stock picking robot” case are identical to the
allegations brought against Jonathan Lebed in 2000, nearly 12 years ago. As will be
discussed in Section IV, the SEC has attempted to make internal changes to keep pace
with the vast increase in fraud cases, however, its enforcement actions remain the same
and it still cannot bring independent criminal actions against internet fraudsters.

69

Id.
SEC v. Thomas Edward Hunter And Alexander John Hunter, Lit. Release No. 22339,
2012 WL 1894183, 1 (April 20, 2012).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
70
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2.

“Cyber-Smear” Schemes:

A close relative to the “pump and dump” scheme is the “cyber-smear” scheme. A
“cyber-smear” scheme for all intents and purposes is the inverse of a “pump and dump”
scheme.75 In a “cyber-smear” scheme the fraudster will anonymously post false and
misleading statements that will decrease the value of a particular stock in order to engage
in a “short sale”76 and turn a profit.77 These schemes are prosecuted in a nearly identical
manner to “pump and dump” schemes and involve the SEC bringing civil actions under
the ’34 Act.78 Notably, “cyber-smear” schemes cases generally have a higher likelihood
of criminal liability attaching because the cases involve a great deal of effort and intent
on the part of the fraudster.79
One early case that demonstrates the significant affect a “cyber-smear” attack has
on unsuspecting companies is United States v. Mark Simeon Jakob.80 Initially, Mr. Jakob
lost nearly $80,000 attempting various short sales of Emulex stock.81

In order to

compensate himself for this loss he orchestrated a fake press release that claimed the
CEO of Emulex was being investigated by the SEC and was about to resign from his

75

Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412.
A short sale is “[a] sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not contracted
for at the time of sale, and that the seller must borrow to make delivery. Such a sale is
usu[ally] made when the seller expects the security's price to drop. If the price does drop,
the seller can make a profit on the difference between the price of the shares sold and the
lower price of the shares bought to pay back the borrowed shares.” Sale, Black's Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
77
Walker, Levine, supra note 8, at 412.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 420.
80
United States v. Mark Simeon Jakob, Lit. Release No. 16857, 2001 WL 15535, 1 (Jan.
8, 2001).
81
Id.
76
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position.82

The result of this press release was immediate and enormous.

It was

estimated that Emulex lost over $2 billion in market share in less than a half an hour.83
While the error was eventually fixed, countless investors lost money when the stock price
began to free-fall.84
The SEC brought a civil suit against Mr. Jacob and coordinated with the United
States Attorneys Office (“USAO”) in order to bring criminal charges.85 Because of the
impact of the damage to Emulex as well as the level of planning Mr. Jakobs put into the
scheme he plead guilty to both the civil and criminal charges.86

Mr. Jakobs was

sentenced to a “maximum prison term of 25 years, a maximum fine equal to two times
the $110 million in investor losses and an order of restitution up to $110 million payable
to the victims of his scheme.”87
While this case provides a good example of how the SEC is able to successfully
coordinate with another governmental entity in order to bring criminal charges against
fraudster, this level of cooperation is not always possible. In fact, certain courts have
expressed concern that this type of dual investigation into a single defendant can run
afoul of due process protections.

In United States v. Stringer, the Ninth Circuit

considered a case where the SEC brought an action against a defendant while the USAO
conducted a parallel investigation.88 Ultimately, the court determined that “there is
nothing improper about the government undertaking simultaneous criminal and civil

82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Jakob, supra note 80.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008).
83
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investigations.”89 However, the court mentioned certain “rare” circumstances where
these parallel investigations can interfere with defendants’ due process rights. The court
stated
[T]o the extent that the individual defendants may have been led through
trickery or deceit to turn over documentary or physical evidence in their
possession or to use their official authority to turn over evidence in the
possession of the corporation, the defendants could state a claim under the
Fourth Amendment. A government official must not affirmatively
mislead the subject of parallel civil and criminal investigations into
believing that the investigation is exclusively civil in nature and will not
lead to criminal charges.90
Here, the SEC and the USAO cooperated within the proper framework when
conducting the parallel investigations into Mr. Jakob. However, it easy to see how these
due process concerns can cause apprehension on the part of the SEC to involve other
agencies into potential securities fraud investigations and vice-a-versa. To surmise, in
addition to having to keep up with the growing rate of internet based “pump and dump”
and “cyber-smear” schemes committed by individuals, the SEC has to also attempt
cooperate within a specified framework so as to not violate defendants due process rights
and allow them to escape liability.
B.

Offerings Frauds:
An offerings frauds involves a type of scheme where an individual will set up a

website or other mechanism in order to sell fraudulent securities.91 In a majority of these
schemes, the securities never actually exist.92

Offerings frauds can originate from

numerous other platforms. As the Director of the SEC’s Office of Enforcement , Richard

89

Id.
Id. at 940 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
91
Walker & Levine, supra note 8, at 423.
92
Id.
90
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Walker, stated, “[t]hese scams are often exotic. For example, we have seen interests
pitched in eel farms, coconut plantations, and, my personal favorite, projects to explore
near earth asteroids.”93
The Internet has streamlined this process, enabling operators of the scheme to be
self-sufficient by simply setting up websites that offer fraudulent securities.94 In 1998,
Matthew Bowin orchestrated one of the first offerings fraud schemes conducted entirely
on the Internet.95 Bowin created a website to launch an IPO for a company named IPS.96
This stock offering garnered over $190,000 from over 150 different investors.97 Bowin
never issued any stock and instead spent all of the money on personal expenses such as
groceries, electronics and bills.98 The SEC successfully brought a civil enforcement
action against Bowin who was convicted on 54 different counts including fraud and
grand theft.99 In addition, state law enforcement successfully pursued criminal charges
that resulted in a 10-year prison sentence.100
Perhaps the most commonly known type of offerings fraud is a Ponzi scheme.101
The general function of a Ponzi scheme involves the payment of alleged returns to

93

Richard H. Walker, Remarks at the National Press Club: A Bull Market in Securities
Fraud? (Apr. 5, 1999), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch265.txt.
94
Hittle, supra note 14, at 169.
95
SEC v. Interactive Products and Services, Inc., and Matthew P. Bowin, Lit. Release
No. 15700, 1998 WL 159331, 1 (Apr. 8, 1998).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
California v. Matthew P. Bowin, Lit. Release No. 16029, 1999 WL 18570 (Jan. 19,
1999).
100
Id.
101
Walker & Levine, supra note 8, at 423.
16

current investors through the funds collected by new investors in the scheme.102 The
operator of the scheme will use the money collected from the new investors in order to
create the illusion of high, fixed returns.103 This requires a constant inflow of funds to
keep the façade of earnings present or else the scheme collapses on itself.104 The Ponzi
scheme derives its name from the infamous confidence man Charles Ponzi who
defrauded numerous investors in the 1920s by promising a 50% return on an investment
based upon international reply coupons for postage stamps.105 This return was 45%
higher than any bank that invested in a similar security.106 Once the cash flows slowed
down, Ponzi was unable to pay current investors and the whole operation fell apart.107
Currently, offerings fraud cases result in greatly increased damages to investors.
In 2011, the SEC brought down a Ponzi scheme operating entirely online that lost nearly
$600 million.108 In that case, Paul Burks and his company Rex Venture Group, used the
website ZeekRewards.com to lure investors into purchasing securities that did not exist.109
The website claimed that investors would receive 50% of the company’s earnings
through a profit sharing system.110

In reality, all of the funds were collected and

distributed using the classic Ponzi scheme model. When the SEC discovered the fraud,

102

See generally, Ponzi Schemes: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Press Release, SEC Shuts Down $600 Million Online Pyramid and Ponzi Scheme,
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-160.htm (modified Aug. 21, 2012).
109
Id.
110
Id.
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the scheme was on the brink of collapse.111 In one month alone, the website had $162
million incoming from investors and nearly $160 million that needed to be paid out to
investors.112
The SEC investigation revealed that there is currently $225 million still
outstanding.113 Burks has reached a private settlement with the SEC that required him to
pay a $4 million fine, relinquish his interest in Rex Venture Group, and work with a court
appointed receiver that will “collect, marshal, manage and distribute remaining assets for
return to harmed investors.”114 Interestingly, this settlement with the SEC allowed Burks
to claim no wrongdoing in connection with the scheme.115
This case illustrates the main issue with the SEC’s current ability to protect
investors from becoming victims of online securities fraud.

While the SEC can

successfully bring enforcement actions and cooperate with state and federal authorities in
pursuing criminal actions, these are all “after the fact” remedies. Whether it is a “pump
and dump” scheme, a “cyber-smear” campaign or a classic Ponzi scheme, the SEC is
taking reactive steps while fraudsters collect larger and larger profits from engaging in
the same schemes they have perpetrated for years.

IV.

THE SEC’S INTERNAL EVOLUTION AND PROGRAMS IT SHOULD
CONSIDER ADOPTING:

The final section of this paper will address the internal changes the SEC has made
in order to keep pace with the growth of the internet and will suggest certain programs
111

Id.
Id.
113
Id.
114
SEC Shuts Down $600 Million Online Pyramid and Ponzi Scheme, supra, note 108.
115
Id.
112

18

used by private parties to detect internet fraud that the SEC should look into adopting.
While the regulation currently enacted by the SEC does not impede its ability to
prosecute fraudsters, a close look into the internal process of the SEC’s enforcement
divisions should to shed light on how efficiently the SEC can detect these schemes before
fraudsters can harm investors.
A.

EDGAR:
The SEC’s first response to the growing popularity of the Internet was its creation

of a centralized database used to gather information on filings required by corporations in
securities trading.116 This program is called the Electronic, Data Gathering, and Analysis
Retrieval System (“EDGAR”).117 The SEC has stated that
[EDGAR’s] primary purpose is to increase the efficiency and fairness of
the securities market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the
economy by accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and
analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the agency.118
In 1993, the SEC began a phase in process that moved EDGAR from being a voluntary
process to the more familiar current day requirement for many, but not all, fillings for
domestic public companies to ensure compliance with SEC filing regulations.119
Regulation S-T governs the requirements and instructions for what must be filed
electronically, including the application for hardship exceptions, as well as instructions
for compliance and is available in the EDGAR Filer Manual.120
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However, the EDGAR system does have inherent drawbacks. Certain documents
cannot currently be posted on EDGAR due to internal SEC policies.121 Further, a number
of documents on EDGAR are voluntary, not mandatory, leading to inconsistent filings
form one company to another depending upon which documents certain companies are
able to afford, or choose, to put online.122 While this was the correct initial step for the
SEC to take in order to adapt to the oncoming internet based culture, it has failed to keep
the system progressing with the current state of the internet and its users.
B.

The Office of Internet Enforcement:

The SEC’s next major move in response to the increase of internet fraud cases
was the establishment of a specialized enforcement division the OIE.123 The goal of this
division was to facilitate a “concentrated effort in investigating Internet security fraud
and act as a civil-enforcement agency, usually looking for fines and injunctions.”124
Initially the OIE had nearly 70 attorneys and staff members working to detect internet
schemes through simple internet searches.125 This division was nicknamed “Cyberforce”
and grew to include well over 200 SEC attorneys conducting independent searches for
fraudulent activity online.126 While this program relied heavily on volunteers and manual
searches, Richard Walker, the Director of the OIE, touted the programs initial success.127
By late 2001, the Cyberforce sweeps had accounted for 209 enforcement actions brought
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by the SEC against internet fraudsters.128 Although this type of program worked well in
the early years of the internet it is doubtful that manual searches will be able to keep pace
with current activity. For example, there are nearly 240 million “pump and dump” email
scams sent every week.129
In addition to the manual searches, the SEC put great emphasis on educating
investors and having the OIE cooperate with the Office of Investor Education and
Assistance (“OIEA”).130 In 2000, Laura Unger, a Commissioner with the SEC stated
We believe that an educated investor provides the best defense -- and
offense-- against securities fraud. Investors who know what questions to
ask and how to detect fraud will be less likely to fall prey to con-artists.
And, because they are more likely to report wrongdoing to the SEC and
their state securities regulators, educated investors serve as an important
early warning system to help regulators fight fraud.131
One of the main functions of the OIE in furthering this goal was to operate the
Enforcement Complaint Center, where so-called “cyber-sleuths” have the ability to report
securities fraud directly to the SEC.132 The SEC claims to utilize other programs to assist
in the search for cyber fraud, however, it has not provided outlines of these programs to
the public.133
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In 2010, the SEC’s Enforcement Division underwent its most massive internal
reorganization since its inception in 1972.134 The OIE was reorganized under the newly
formed Office of Market Intelligence (“OMI.”).135 Accordingly, it was noted that the
OMI “will assume the responsibilities of the Internet enforcement unit and add new
duties, such as handling tips and referrals.”136

The reorganization is not entirely

surprising as the increase in internet usage for securities transactions is significantly
greater than when the department originated.137 Much like the EDGAR program, the
SEC initially took the correct step to keep up with the increase consumer utilization of
the internet.
The difference in this situation is that the SEC appeared to understand that
internet usage and securities transactions were so intertwined that the OIE needed to be
retooled to keep pace. Unfortunately, because the SEC has not made any information
available to the public regarding its current tools used to track internet schemes before
investors are damaged, it remains unknown if the current department has upgraded its
searching capabilities from the currently outdated ideas such as Cyberforce.
C.

Scamalyrz—A Private Solution Worth Looking Into:
While the SEC encourages “cyber-sleuths” to report potential online fraud to its

Enforcement Complaint Center, private parties have taken online fraud detection one-step
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further. Scamalyzr is a privately funded and designed “word based text classification
tool” that is currently used by the New Brunswick Securities Commission.138 It operates
by searching “a corpus of continuously updated new website instances (retrieved from the
web) for prevalence of a pre-determined set of relevant words and then ranks them based
on the presence and frequency of these words.”139 This software has led to investigations
of suspicious website in numerous countries, including the United States, Canada and
England.140 To date, Scamalyzr has searched over 13 million domains.141
However, this software is not without its own set of problems. Due to the text
base searches based on buzzwords used in fraudulent schemes the software has a
tendency to produce false positives.142

In fact, in certain instances the Scamalyzr

produced upward of 80% false positive results.143 Some of the false positive results are
attributed to the fact that the programmers are unable to identify what captured sites are
truly fraudulent until the government brings a fraud action against the individuals
operating the particular site.144 While the results are “far from perfect”145 it is a step
forward in combating online securities fraud that the SEC has not publicly taken yet.
The SEC made initial attempts to adapt to the rapid expansion of the internet
through the installation of the comprehensive online securities registration program
EDGAR as well as by establishing the OIE to conduct internet sweeps for fraudulent
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activity and increase investor education of potential risks.146 However, the SEC needs to
be more aggressive in keeping up with internet growth. Programs like Scamalyzr, while
not without their own faults, are clearly the way of the future of fraud detection in the
internet. Simply because of the sheer amount of internet traffic on a daily basis, manual
web searches and electronic tip centers will be insufficient to proactively track internet
fraudsters before they are able to execute their schemes and severely damage innocent
investors.
V.

CONCLUSION:

The SEC has been entrusted to regulate the exchange and sales of securities in
both the primary and secondary markets. In the late 1990s, Richard Walker, and John
Stark expressed different view points on the effect the Internet would have on the SEC’s
ability to effectively keep up with the evolving technology. Mr. Walker believed that the
statutory scheme of enforcement would be more than enough to secure the SEC in
bringing enforcement actions against online fraudsters while Mr. Stark believed the
internet posed a great threat to investor security.147 Nearly 15 years later it is clear that
while the SEC has the ability to prosecute internet fraud under the current regulatory
scheme of the ’33 and ’34 Acts, it is doing so from an increasingly reactionary position.
With the total amount of web pages accessed per day nearing 100 billion, the
increase in attempted fraud has been significant.

Whereas the SEC had brought

enforcement actions against a total 209 individuals up to the year 2001, it is estimated
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that currently 240 million “pump and dump” emails are sent out per week.148
Additionally, the amount of damage done to investors by fraudsters has increased along
with the number of schemes attempted. Just this year the SEC came across an internet
based Ponzi scheme that lost $600 million of investors money.149
Adding to the SEC’s hardship is its inability to independently bring criminal
actions against individuals or entities. Instead, it must work cooperatively with state and
federal agencies to bring criminal actions against fraudsters.150 This requires a great deal
of coordination between the SEC and other agencies and adds additional due process
concerns into the framework.151
Moreover, the SEC’s internal policies have not done much to keep pace with the
internet’s expansion. The creation of EDGAR does require many companies to file
financial documents online, however numerous documents cannot be published through
EDGAR and companies can get around this mandate through hardship exemptions.152
Even its publicly available investigation methods seem outdated. In 2001 the Cyberforce,
a group that consisted of attorneys and volunteers, manually scanned the internet
searching for potential fraud schemes.153 Currently, the SEC would be better served by
implementing technology like Scamalyzr, which uses automated text searches to flag
potential fraud schemes.154
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While Mr. Walker may have been correct in stating that the regulatory scheme
would hold up fine against the onset of internet securities fraud, it appears that Mr.
Stark’s concerns regarding the internet being the SEC’s greatest enforcement challenge
accurately reflects the SEC current inability to get in front of online perpetrators of
securities fraud. Until the SEC is able to keep up with the rapidly evolving technology, it
will be playing catch up to fraudsters who will continue to reap incredible profits at the
expense of innocent investors.
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